Joint action in action? Local economic development forums and industry cluster development in Central Java, Indonesia by Phelps, NA & Wijaya, HB
 
 
 
Phelps, NA; Wijaya, HB; (2016) Joint action in action? Local economic development forums and 
industry cluster development in Central Java, Indonesia. International Development Planning Review 
(In press). Downloaded from UCL Discovery: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1473221.  
 
ARTICLE 
 
Joint action in action? Local economic development forums and 
industry cluster development in Central Java, Indonesia 
 
Nicholas A. Phelps1 and Holi bina Wijaya2  
1 Bartlett School of Planning, University College London, 22 Gordon Street, London, WC1H 
0QB; E-mail: N.phelps@ucl.ac.uk. 
2 Holi bina Wijaya, Urban and Regional Planning Department, Diponegoro University, 
Kampus UNDIP Tembalang, Semarang; E-mail: holibinawijaya@yahoo.com.  
 
Abstract 
It has been argued that the growth potential of industry clusters in developing countries is 
dependent on join action to release external economy effects that otherwise remain latent. In 
this paper we report on the progress and impacts of a programme in Central Java to develop 
capacity for joint action in industry clusters via economic forums in local government 
jurisdictions. We focus in on the emerging relationship between industry clusters and their 
respective economic forums in four local government jurisdictions. Despite progress, the 
findings reveal the difficulties of developing new institutions to support joint action. These 
difficulties follow from the limits presented by the private sector dynamics underlying industry 
clusters and from variations in local government organisation, resourcing and understandings 
of the remit of these new institutions.        
   
Introduction 
It has been argued that the many industry clusters in developing countries fail to develop 
‘collective efficiencies’ since external economies (the measurable pecuniary and 
unmeasurable technological advantages arising from the spatial clustering of businesses (see, 
for example, Scitovsky, 1954)) can remain latent unless mobilised by joint action (defined as 
conscious cooperation among businesses (see Schmitz, 1999)) and that this, in turn, is a 
failure of public policy (Schmitz, 1995, 1999).1  The ‘collective efficiencies’ of developing 
country industry agglomerations – a term used in development studies – are seen as resulting 
from the effects of joint action upon erstwhile latent external economies: industrial clusters in 
Indonesia were an inspiration for this line of thought (Sandee et al 2002, 1994, Sandee and 
Weijland, 1989; Weijland, 1999). However, optimism surrounding the prospects of these 
clusters, based on their similarity to groups of flexibly specialised firms in ‘the Third Italy’, gave 
way to pessimism surrounding the effects of their integration into global value chains 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Consequently, research into the potential for joint action to 
stimulate the development of such clusters has been limited.  
 
This paper focuses on the potential for institutional support for joint action through an 
examination of a programme in the Indonesian province of Central Java to create new 
institutions to develop economic strategy-making capacity, including joint action for industry 
clusters. A Forum Pengembangan Ekonimi dan Sumber Daya (Economic and Resource 
                                                          
1 Notwithstanding the limitations of the term cluster (Martin and Sunley, 2003), we use the 
terms agglomeration and cluster interchangeably given the prevalence of the term within the 
development studies literature and in the Central Java policy context.  
Development Forum, FPESD) was established at provincial level in central Java supported by 
German development organisation GIZ. Under the FPESD, forums for economic development 
and employment promotion (FEDEP) have been established at the local government (city and 
district) level to organise local industry into a series of Forums Rembuk Klaster (cluster 
discussion forums, FRK) (GTZ, 2004; P5 Universitas Diponegoro, 2014).  
 
We begin by reviewing the literature regarding joint action and industry clusters, questioning 
the latency of such external economy effects and the possibilities for policy to stimulate joint 
action among businesses in industry clusters in developing countries. We then describe the 
origins and aims of a new set of institutions in Central Java to foster industry clusters and 
describe our research methods. In particular we draw on a comprehensive monitoring survey 
of all FEDEPs (P5 Universitas Diponegoro, 2013) as well as interviews focusing on the 
relationship between three batik and three wood/rattan working clusters and their respective 
FEDEP organisations in four local government jurisdictions. The conclusions highlight the 
importance of having realistic expectations regarding the possibilities for public policy to 
fashion joint action not least because of the effects of the segmentation of industry on the 
latency of external economy effects and the, as yet, limited capacity and adaptive efficiency 
of new institutions designed to support joint action in industry clusters.       
 
The limits of joint action in industry clusters 
Craft industry clusters in developing countries appear similar to the ‘social network’ model 
(Gordon and McCann, 2000) of agglomeration found in the industrial districts of ‘the Third 
Italy’. However the former have been markedly less successful than the latter, leading analysts 
to highlight the impediments to joint action and the mobilisation of external economies or 
collective efficiencies among businesses in developing countries (Weijland, 1999).2 That is, 
latent external economies of specialization in craft industry clusters in developing countries 
are in need of release through the joint action resulting from self-organisation among 
businesses or via government policy (Schmitz, 1999). Drawing on the case of Indonesia, we 
identify some of the limits to this story in terms of: assumptions regarding the latency of 
external economy effects and the design of appropriate and adaptively efficient institutions 
capable of stimulating joint action.    
 
The latency of external economies 
The latency of external economies in developing country industry clusters cannot be assumed 
in a situation where many are composed of enterprises whose mode of operation is survival 
(Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999; Nichter and Goldmark, 2009). Where external 
economies are latent, their relationship with joint action remains unclear.  
 
A question remains whether industry clusters in developing countries have the critical mass to 
sustain the formation of external economy effects. In Indonesia, the Asian financial crisis 
coupled with the initial effects of decentralisation legislation has meant that many industry 
clusters have experienced severe retrenchment.   
 
While the most successful export-oriented clusters in developed countries may exhibit vertical 
as well as horizontal disintegration (Scott, 1983, 1986) (involving returns to scale and product 
differentiation), the more common tendency has been for industry clusters in developing 
countries to be characterised only by horizontal disintegration with little product differentiation 
– this is often the case in Indonesia including, to an extent, the cases we examine here (JICA, 
                                                          
2 A further complication is that there are distinctly different forms of industry agglomeration. 
Gordon and McCann (2000) contrast ‘pure Marshallian’ and ‘social network’ forms (in which 
external economies are likely to be latent and available to small businesses) with the 
‘production complex’ (where vertical integration around a few large firms precludes the 
development of external economies).   
2004). The balance between processes of internalisation and externalisation in (and between 
internal and external constraints on) business development are vital to the design of 
appropriate institutions in support of joint action in developing countries. The neglect of this 
issue in discussions of the potential contributions of public policy to collective dynamics is all 
the more surprising given the literature pointing to the constraints on individual firms in 
developing countries (Schmitz, 1982) including Indonesia (Turner, 2003). Vertical 
disintegration rarely seems to extend into many non-production activities locally within 
developing countries, underlining how the possibilities for industry clusters need to be 
understood in a context in which the sales, marketing and distribution of these products 
continues to be dominated by western ‘buyers’ (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002; Perlin, 1983). 
Consequently, it is far from clear whether informal industry clusters can draw upon or capture 
the external economy effects commonly associated with industrial agglomeration (Moreno-
Monroy, 2012). 
 
The relationship between internal and external economies is connected to the origin of joint 
action and policy design. Joint action can occur spontaneously among businesses as a 
consequence of, or alongside, government intervention (Schmitz, 2005). However, where 
significant external economies are latent, they may not be amenable to public policy. 
Hierarchical privately-organised joint action may be quite resistant to public policy compared 
to horizontal joint action among businesses as processes of vertical disintegration may be 
subject to limits quite early on in a segmented local economy (Taylor and Thrift, 1982) with 
larger firms organising industries along ethnic and extended family lines. Indeed, for informal 
enterprises to capture important external economy effects, ‘the relationships between formal 
and informal enterprises along the value chain must be symmetrical and non-hierarchical’ 
(Moreno-Monroy, 2012: 2024). This has led Moreno-Monroy (2012) and Nichter and Goldmark 
(2009) to suggest that policy needs to recognise business segmentation.  
 
In sum, it may simply be that industry clusters represent no particular advantages to the 
businesses involved (Perry, 2005). Moreover, where external economies are latent, their 
mobilisation through joint action involves questions of institutional design – the issue to which 
we now turn.  
 
Institutions for joint action 
There seems little doubt that institutions have been co-present in industry clusters (Amin and 
Thrift, 1992; Storper, 1995) but this says nothing about their causal role in the release of 
external economies. The theory of agglomeration based on the concept of external economies 
continues to contain troublesome elements of circularity regarding cause and effect (Phelps, 
1992). While empirical studies show joint action to be apparent (Scott, 2002) and to have 
contributed unevenly to improved business performance (Nadvi, 1999, 2007) in developing 
country industry clusters, it is unclear whether such joint action is cause or effect of external 
economies. Jacobs (1969) argued that Marshallian agglomerations embodied sterile divisions 
of labour compared to the diversity that sustained the growth a development of the very largest 
cities. The implication is that strongly institutionalised manifestations of joint action - such as 
business representative organisations involved with branding, training and skills development 
– may be a consequence of past growth and competitive success.  
 
Furthermore, there is a case for suggesting that the limitations on public policy in support of 
joint action at the local level in developing countries have been underestimated. First, although 
policy prescription has shifted from an emphasis on ‘getting prices right’ to ‘getting institutions 
right’ (Rodrik, 2008) as a reaction to insights from evolutionary and institutional economics 
(North, 1990), there remains a need for sensitivity to historical context surrounding the design 
of appropriate of institutions for joint action. The term ‘embedded liberalism’ attached to many 
western economies reminds us that key institutions – including those designed to foster joint 
action - have emerged within societal contexts which nurtured the formation and functioning 
of markets. The present-day institutional bases to the social network model of industry 
agglomeration in the likes of ‘the Third Italy’ have taken hundreds of years to evolve. However, 
it is unclear quite how new or reformed institutions capable of performing a parallel role in 
developing countries can emerge in the short term. The fact that ‘best practice’ continues to 
be promulgated by international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
is likely to be part of the problem. Best practices are, by definition, de-contextualised, partial 
in their embrace of points of policy and regulatory leverage, and are likely to be inappropriate 
to the needs of developing countries (Rodrik, 2008). The financial and human resources 
within, and technical capacity available to, the local government sector in developing countries 
are often limited and – crucially – unstable, such that the value of imported policy solutions 
based on incremental improvements in stable fiscal and political systems is questionable 
(Masser, 1986). Indeed the private sector may exist and develop in spite of government and 
the oft-cited ‘costs of doing business’. Worse,  the mimicking of such best practice is one 
technique by which failures in policy implementation are obscured as local and national 
governments seek to ‘look like a state’ (Pritchett, Woolcock and Andrews, 2013: 4). 
 
Second, the question of appropriate design of institutions reveals itself not as a case of rational 
selection from a number of ahistorical templates but as choices taken within socially and 
culturally embedded perceptions of extant economic and institutional realities and the 
possibilities for change (North, 2010). Policy interventions rarely start from where they 
assume, while what North (2010) terms the ‘adaptive efficiency’ of institutions may be lacking 
in developing countries. In Central Java in Indonesia, the creation of new institutions in support 
of joint action in industry agglomerations has been overlain on other elements that embody a 
measure of, or basis for, localised joint action.3 It is also important to recognise that policy to 
help fashion new institutions in support of joint action also took place against a backcloth of 
governmental decentralisation which has produced a decentralisation of rent seeking 
behaviour in political and bureaucratic circles (Hadiz and Robison, 2005) such that interim 
institutions – such as the FEDEPs considered here - emerging between state and society may 
be open to capture by local elites (Wollenberg et al, 2006). The calibre and credibility of local 
political leadership appears to be the determining factor in the progress of local governments 
towards greater regulatory efficiency and institutional reform (Von Luebke, 2009), yet it is 
rarely in evidence or consistent over time. The problems extend from political leadership into 
aspects of the organisation and efficacy of local administrations with implications for local 
policy initiation and implementation.   
         
Research contexts and methods 
Central Java, (figure 1), provides a unique region to study industry clusters and the support 
for them. A system of FEDEPs or local economic forums in central Java was proposed by GIZ 
in 2001, couched in terms of creating new local institutions for promoting economic 
development under its Economic and Human Resources Development (EHRD) programme. 
Here GIZ’s interests were positioned rather differently from the calls for macro-economic and 
regulatory reform found in much academic and policy advocacy, as the minutes of the meeting 
at which agreement on the EHRD programme reveal:  
                                                          
3 There are at least three elements here. First, musyawarah (discussion or negotiation) and 
arisan (a rotating local savings association) in which contributions from members are 
distributed at regular meetings are a legacy of traditional Javanese culture. Second, the rituals 
of Islamic religion provide a platform around which social gatherings take place and include 
the traditions of pengajian (regular meetings centred on prayers and readings) and zakat 
(alms-giving) which involves the redistribution of a proportion of an individual’s wealth at the 
time of the Eid al Fitre celebrations marking the end of Ramadhan. Third, as well as national 
industry associations (and their local branches) which remain reasonably vibrant, there are 
also the remnants of once powerful and well-organised cooperatives for small businesses from 
the time of ‘guided democracy’ under Sukarno’s presidency (1945-1967). 
‘One of the factors to determine the existence of industrial competitiveness is incentive, 
which covers macroeconomic management, trade policy, and institutional rules and 
regulations. However, two other determinants, which are not less important, are market 
… and related institutional development (training institutions, technology support 
institutions, and financial institutions)’ (GTZ 2001). 
 
As the same minutes went on to describe:  
 
‘The overall goal of the programme is to promote Indonesia’s economic and human 
resources development in industrial sector by means of improving the effectiveness of 
public policies through the enhancement of close collaboration between governmental 
and private stakeholders at all levels in an effort to reach a social consensus which 
shall be useful for the creation of consistent policies and their implementation’ (GTZ, 
2001).  
 
The EHRD programme was applied in Central Java, under the auspices of The FPESD. After 
the creation of six trial local economic development and employment promotion forums 
(FEDEPs) in Klaten, Cilacap, Wonosobo, Jepara, Pati and Pekalongan in 2000, the provincial 
level FPESD was established in August 2001 (P5 Universitas Diponegoro, 2014).  
 
The FEDEPs were not intended as executing bodies for programmes/projects  but were 
intended as multi-stakeholder dialogue fora intended to: facilitate, mediate and coordinate the 
domestic development process; develop the vision for domestic development; generate 
development strategies; define, monitor, evaluate application of development 
programmes/projects; voice sectoral demand; provide input for policy makers; enable 
cooperation among stakeholders, and; coordinate sectoral policies (GTZ,  2004: 7-8). Among 
the benefits anticipated were capacity building among stakeholders, the mobilisation of 
domestic resources and a sustained focus on economic development (GTZ, 2004: 10). The 
intention was for the FEDEPs to be assisted and funded by, but to exist outside of, local 
government and draw upon advice and input from the private sector which organises industry 
cluster forums. The provincial government contributes funds towards the establishment and 
maintenance of local FEDEPs, though these are to cover only the costs of arranging and 
attending meetings and the training of FEDEP and industry representatives. As new 
institutions encouraged at the local level within Central Java, there is no singular template for 
the organisation, strategic priorities, timetable of meetings and specific interventions of the 
FEDEPs, though most of the FEDEPs have a focus that maps onto or uses the language 
associated with industry clusters.  
 
These aspirations for the creation of institutions to support joint action within industry clusters 
were catapulted into a turbulent period in Indonesian history. Legislation ushered in a period 
of pemekaran (the creation of many new local governments), the creation and subsequent 
revoking of new local laws and taxes, and ambiguities over the responsibilities of central, 
provincial and local governments, with impacts on businesses. The GIZ EHRD programme 
recognised, though underestimated, the impact of such turbulence when spelling-out the 
objective to ‘restructure and revitalize business institutions’ many of which had collapsed.          
 
GIZ funded the development of an initial 6 local government FEDEPs jointly with provincial 
government, with the latter promoting and part-funding the remaining 29 of 35 FEDEPs across 
Central Java thereafter (see figure 1). Provincial government allocates money for the 
continuing development of the local FEDEPs, with the idea being that this money should be 
matched with funds from local government budgets. Local governments have augmented this 
funding by typically 30-40% of the value of provincial government funds. Over time, the 
coverage of these new FEDEP institutions in Central Java has increased from the initial 6 in 
2001, to 24 in 2006, to complete coverage of 35 in 2011 with FEDEP Boyolali now inactive - 
leaving 34 in 2013 (P5 Universitas Diponegoro, 2014).      
In what follows, we draw on data collected for a province-wide monitoring and basic evaluation 
of the FEDEP programme completed in 2013. Data on the performance of each of the 35 
FEDEP organisations created across central Java was collected with a score given for each 
of 9 metrics in 2011. Data were collected again in 2012 but with a revised set of scores 
attached to each of the 9 criteria. These data were collected in a series of meetings with a 
need to demonstrate documentary evidence relating to each of the 9 criteria. These 
quantitative data set the context for understanding new institutional development in support of 
joint action in industry clusters and provide a basic means of gauging the adaptive efficiency 
of such new institutions.   
 
These data are supplemented by interviews with stakeholders in six industry clusters (batik 
and wood/rattan industries) within four local government jurisdictions. The batik production 
process involves a limited vertical division of labour – such as pre-shrinking and drying of 
cotton materials, copper stamp making, the drawing and stamping of wax outlines and 
designs, dying and manufacture of garments. The two largest companies (which are not part 
of this study) have also engaged in backward vertical integration into the production of cotton 
textiles. Businesses have also sought forward vertical integration into the retail, restaurant and 
accommodation business involving geographically extensive patterns of putting-out of 
different activities to different businesses and homeworkers well beyond the clusters within 
the surrounding districts. In the case of the wooden and rattan furniture and wood carving 
clusters, the typical pattern is one of a horizontal division of labour with different producers 
specialising in different designs before passing semi-finished items for finishing often by larger 
companies involved in distribution and export. As a result production is largely contained within 
particular villages within Jepara and Sukoharjo.        
 
Coincidentally these clusters exist in some of the better performing local governments. 
However, as table 1 reveals, the characteristics of these four districts varies, setting the 
context for understanding the dynamics of the industry clusters and the efficacy of policy in 
support of joint action. As is to be expected, the two relatively compact cities of Surakarta and 
Pekalongan have more productive economies (higher GDP per capita) and lower rates of 
poverty than the larger rural or semi-rural districts of Sukoharjo and Jepara.  Nevertheless, 
the latter jurisdictions are geographically extensive, contain significant populations and have 
experienced significant growth of non-farm enterprises.        
 
We studied the batik industry in Surakarta – a city which has emerged as a model of local 
government (Bunnell et al, 2013; Phelps et al., 2014). We examined one wooden and one 
rattan furniture cluster in Sukoharjo - a district which together with Surakarta forms part of an 
urban corridor in which inter-locality competition and comparison has driven better local 
government performance (Von Luebke et al, 2009). The Pekalongan batik industry has been 
more commercially oriented than that in Surakarta. The wood carving cluster in Senenan 
village in Jepara was a more manageable one to study than the much larger wooden furniture 
cluster spread across the whole district.  A total of 11 interviews were conducted with the 
FEDEP representatives and industry cluster representatives in March and July 2013. The 
interviews typically lasted 90 minutes and covered issues of the formation, organisation and 
strategic priorities of the FEDEP organisations, their impacts in terms of promoting joint action 
in, and the self-organisation of, the industry clusters. 
 
Joint action in action? Illustrations from Central Java 
In this section we examine the role of the FEDEPs in facilitating joint action across six industry 
clusters, drawing on interviews with FEDEP staff and industry cluster leaders in four local 
government areas and a criteria-based evaluation of the FEDEPs, with key findings 
summarised in table 3.    
 
 
 
The latency of external economies? 
The activity of FEDEPs maps closely onto 175 agriculture, manufacturing and tourism industry 
clusters that are supported by public policy at local and provincial level. However, do all of 
these clusters have the critical mass to generate external economies? Some are composed 
of a handful of businesses scattered across a whole city and could hardly be said to be industry 
clusters or agglomerations. Others consist of sizable numbers of businesses in a single village. 
The diversity included under this label is indicative of a chaotic concept (Martin and Sunley, 
2003).  
 
In table 3 we indicate that several of our case study ‘clusters’ lacked critical mass. The sizeable 
wooden furniture industry in Jepara is composed of an estimated 16,000 businesses. The 
smaller specialised wood carving cluster of the village of Senenan within Jepara is made up 
of 32 business groups with the chairman of this industry preferring the label ‘centre’ rather 
than cluster due to its limited scale (Interview 2: Chairman, Senenan Wood Carving Cluster, 
14 March 2013). The batik and rattan furniture industry clusters covered in this paper have 
recently collapsed to a point where it is debateable whether an industry cluster can be said to 
truly exist. The rattan furniture industry in Sukoharjo, for instance, collapsed from 510 
businesses existing prior to 2007 to 193 by 2013 (Interview 3: Chairman, Rattan Cluster, 12 
March 2013). There are presently an estimated 90 businesses in the Laweyan area, only 25 
of which are production-oriented (Interview 4: Chairman, Batik Laweyan Cluster, 11 March 
2013). With 120 or so businesses, Kauman is a larger but even less production-oriented 
cluster than Laweyan,  with only an estimated 8 producers and 20 shops ordering from 
producers spread across the city region (Interview 5: Chairman, Batik Kauman Cluster, 10 
March 2013).   
 
As table 3 also summarises, the extent of vertical disintegration of production among the 
industry cluster examples that we examined is quite limited. In the batik industry in Surakarta, 
the tendency today is for a much reduced number of small and medium sized – essentially 
design and retail - companies to put out certain parts or all of the production process to 
individual home workers located outside the city (Interview 4). The batik cluster in Laweyan 
has been partially rejuvinated around activities such as homesteads and tourism and 
improvements in street furniture and marketing. On the one hand, this represents a vertical 
extension of the division of labour associated with batik into non-production activities which 
can add value. On the other hand, this does not represent a deepening of the division of labour 
within production activities themselves which might drive internationally competitive exports.   
 
Both the batik industries of Laweyan and Kauman in Surakarta and the rattan furniture industry 
in the neighbouring district of Sukoharjo emerged as a consequence of the Mataram kingdom 
in Surakarta (dating to the 1700s). Historically, some batik was not a commodity as specific 
designs could only be worn by royalty, though it is best not to make over much of such 
constraints on industry development (Sekimoto, 2000). In Pekalongan the batik industry grew 
independently of royal behest and continues to be produced on a much greater scale by 
around 600 SMEs and thousands of homeworkers (Interview 6: Chairman, Secretary and ex-
Chairman FEDEP Pekalongan, 10 July 2013). Nevertheless, despite its scale, collective 
efficiencies appear to be a passive reflection of a large number of producers. There is 
horizontal disintegration of production and a large market for skill in the city but little in the way 
of explicit cooperation among batik producers (Interview 6).     
 
It is unclear whether we can speak of the latency of external economies when many of the 
industry clusters that exist across the province have been initiated at the behest of 
government. This is the complaint of an interviewee from GIZ (Interview 1: Local Economic 
Senior Advisor, GIZ, 13 March 2013) and several of the industry cluster representatives 
interviewed confirmed that their industry cluster forums were formed at the behest of the 
FEDEP or the provincial government.  
There was also a degree of in-fighting among companies regarding the new institutions 
designed to promote joint action. This stems from the extant private sector organisation of 
industry clusters and exists despite the modest amounts of funding channelled via the 
FEDEPs. The rattan industry cluster in Sukoharjo would be a case in point. A cluster 
representative body was recently re-established but prior to a major crisis affecting the cluster 
in 2007 the collective organisation by companies themselves had collapsed several times. 
One of the reasons cited was that members of the board of the collective had used it for their 
own ends (Interview 3). This, in turn, was due to the structure of the industry locally with a gap 
in terms the financial resources and attitudes of 20 or so large companies and the many 
smaller companies to which they put out work. In the recent past, arrangements for smaller 
companies to make a loan payment to bigger companies in return for bulk purchases of 
material collapsed due to problems of slow repayment.  
 
Thus, in table 3 we indicate that horizontal self-organisation was the norm across our study 
areas and industries. This was the case in the Senenan wood carving industry and the wooden 
furniture industry in Sukoharjo which are composed of small companies. In Senenan, the 32 
businesses in one village have organised themselves into a cooperative taking in membership 
fees which have funded loans to individual businesses and the purchase and rent of 
equipment such as a compressor and table saw and for shared use by craftsmen (Interview 
2).  The wooden furniture industry in Sukoharjo is organised to make semi-finished products 
and for these to be finished and exported from Surakarta and Yogyakarta by exporters and 
buyers. While there are some opportunities for the development of the value chain locally, joint 
action has focused on more modest targets. Thus a collective of wooden furniture makers 
established itself in 2009 at the request of the local FEDEP and provincial government 
(Interview 7: Chairman, Wooden Furniture Cluster, 12 March 2013), taking financial collections 
that are redistributed on a syndicate basis with one business being selected each month to 
receive business development investment contributions. The collective has also taken a 
number of other initiatives. Since, it already has a brand with local exporters and buyers, they 
come to the collective which takes on the responsibility for distributing orders among 
members. It has also accumulated some of the contributions in order to purchase supplies of 
raw materials and distribute these to members.  
 
The wooden furniture industry in Sukoharjo is one of the stronger examples of self-organised 
joint action by an industry cluster and has benefited from other investments, including Bank 
Indonesia’s donation of an oven for wood hardening and a jointing machine from the Ministry 
for Cooperatives in Jakarta. Yet questions remain over the future of the industry cluster. 
Despite funding from the FEDEP and local government, there were complaints that support 
from the mayor was limited (Interview 7). Interest in joining from non-members is strong, 
though the present organisation of the collective (35 members out of an estimated 250-300 
wooden furniture makers in Sukoharjo) cannot be expanded until the syndicated distribution 
of funds has completed a single cycle (Interview 7).  
 
Surakarta’s batik industry declined sharply during the 1980s and 1990s when many 
businesses closed or relocated from Laweyan and Kauman. Subsequently, the batik cluster 
in Laweyan was galvanised formally in 2004 prior to Surakarta emerging as a model of political 
and policy leadership nationally. The move was instigated by the private sector itself with a 
presentation to Bappeda (the economic planning department of the local government) and the 
then mayor. The main joint action so far has preceded the activities of the FEDEP and involved 
the construction of a waste water treatment facility funded by GIZ. Only 4 of the 25 batik 
producers do not contribute to its upkeep, though this does expose issues of ‘free rider’ 
behaviour. Aid from SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) has 
helped local companies reach the Swedish market through the communication of appropriate 
designs. It is estimated that the batik cluster in Laweyan has received in the order of 40 million 
rupiah (approximately US$ 2940 at October 2015 exchange rates) under three projects.  The 
FEDEP has channelled 6.5 million rupiah towards (US$470) printing marketing brochures, 
while money for facilitating cluster meetings has also amounted to a further 10 million rupiah 
(US$734) (Interview 4).  
 
Appropriate and adaptively efficient institutions?  
An immediate problem with the creation of a new institution such as the FEDEP at the local 
level is that of defining its purpose and its organisational design and in table 3 we indicate that 
this is one of the weaknesses of the FEDEPs. In the developing country context, the extended 
period of time over which the process of defining a role for a new institution like the FEDEP 
(and negotiating an understanding of that role among stakeholders) can take place should not 
be underestimated. The fact that confusion continued to be apparent at a recent annual 
progress review meeting of all FEDEPs in central Java in March 2013, fully a decade after the 
FEDEP policy was initiated, is evidence of this.  
 
The FEDEP in Jepara was among the first six to be established in 2000 but interviewees 
suggested that it took three years to reach some understanding among stakeholders as to the 
role of the FEDEP. During this time there was great uncertainty about whether the FEDEP 
should be a think-tank or an executing organisation with the FEDEP attempting to provide 
technical assistance to businesses (Interview 8: Head of Economic Division, Bappeda and 
Secretary FEDEP Jepara, 14 March 2013). Moreover, some debate still remains regarding 
the purpose of the FEDEP, with its head wanting it to have a more powerful role akin to an 
economic commission. In Surakarta, suggestions for the creation of a business plan and value 
chain analysis to inform the work of the FEDEP with regard to batik Kauman have been 
regarded as too complicated for the current capacity of industry and the FEDEP.   
 
The FEDEPs studied presented a range of roles in their development of joint action. In Jepara 
and Sukoharjo the FEDEPs were attempting to facilitate joint action across a large number of 
industry clusters. In Jepara, nine clusters were being supported, though active facilitation at 
least seemed to focus on a single cluster at any one time. In Sukoharjo, where progress in the 
formation of the FEDEP itself had been hampered by in-fighting among a range of industry 
interests, no such prioritisation is apparent. Here the FEDEP leader was appointed partly as 
an impartial figure and partly with a view to balancing these different industry interests. So 
protracted seem to have been the difficulties that a first round of meetings was only initiated 
in 2013 – over a decade after the FEDEP programme was inaugurated. This would appear to 
be one case of joint inaction as a result of conflicts over the very existence of the FEDEP and 
the perceived spoils to be distributed through it. In this case the FEDEP is attempting to 
facilitate the development of as many as ten clusters. This has meant that the FEDEP budget 
has been enough only to fund a series of meetings for each of the clusters in order for them 
to formulate policies for joint action with the FEDEP playing no direct role in the financing of 
projects other than for some limited training of each industry cluster representative.   
 
It should be remembered that Sukoharjo is a district with a sizable population and economy. 
In the case of the batik industry much of the production activities that were formerly in 
Surakarta have moved to neighbouring jurisdictions such as Sukoharjo. Indeed, one cluster 
supported in Sukoharjo is a batik cluster which, according to figures quoted at interviews, is 
larger than those in Surakarta. This is an important feature of what McGee (1991) termed a 
desakota pattern of urbanisation - a little recognised but distinct challenge to the promotion of 
industry clusters, the organisation of joint action and the mobilisation of any external economy 
effects within a country like Indonesia.4 When initially interviewed there was no cooperation 
between the FEDEPs of the two jurisdictions despite such obvious economic connections, 
                                                          
4 This desakota pattern tends to involve an organisation of production that is intermediate in 
multiple respects. Namely, between:  urban and rural; agrarian and industrial; local 
agglomeration and spatial dispersal; formality and informality; aggressive accumulation and 
survival.       
though informal coordination among the FEDEPs of the Solo Raya (greater Surakarta) region 
has emerged since.  
 
The Sukoharjo case contrasts with that in the neighbouring city of Surakarta where the focus 
has been on prioritising support for industry clusters one at a time and in providing direct 
support for some specific joint actions. The focus in Surakarta has been limited to the two batik 
industry clusters in Laweyan and Kauman. In fact, little direct support appears to have been 
offered to Laweyan where industry organised itself to provide something of an inspiration to 
the FEDEP’s work in Kauman. Alongside the funding of meetings of the industry cluster, part 
of the budget of the FEDEP has been channelled into specific joint actions such as the creation 
of a cooperative shop in Kauman and road and street furniture improvements.   
 
The design of these new institutions in support of joint action for industry clusters is exposed 
to issues of funding and human resources. Table 2 provides figures on the annual budgets for 
our four case study FEDEPs. It shows the provincial and the local contribution for each year 
and the sum of these contributions over five years. Overall, the total financial resource to the 
FEDEPs across the time period was modest and fairly similar – the FEDEP budget in Jepara 
being less than ten per cent more than Surakarta’s. Nevertheless, table 2 also reveals 
variations in the total funding of FEDEPs in any given year underlining, in particular, the sorts 
of budgetary constraints that may impede policy transfer from developed to developing 
countries (Masser, 1986). Across the time period and across the four FEDEPs, the biggest 
variation was between the funding for Surakarta in 2011 and that for Jepara in 2009. Jepara 
experienced the biggest variations in total FEDEP budgets (varying from a high point in years 
2009 and 2010 to a low in 2011) which coincided with the biggest variations in local 
contributions. Over the five year time period, the district allocation in Pekalongan was 59 
percent more than in Jepara.    
 
Some of the budget variation from year to year derives from the provincial government budget 
allocation itself as this is calculated on the basis of the performance of local governments and 
partly it seems because local FEDEPs have been asked to take on additional roles of 
coordinating sub-provincial meetings (Interview 8). However, the desire or ability of local 
governments to augment this allocation with their own funds varies over time and from place 
to place. For one of our interviewees the local allocation was dependent upon the inclination 
of the mayor (Interview 4) and in the experience of another it could fall to zero in a year that 
coincided with a local election (Interview 8).  
 
In Indonesia these issues have been exacerbated by discontinuities in the effectiveness of 
local governments since the decentralisation legislation from 1999 onwards. This includes the 
effectiveness of leadership and vision projected by elected politicians. In the cases studied 
here, mayoral support for industry clusters was rarely in evidence. The mayor appears to have 
been involved in the business of the FEDEP in Pekalongan as a result of his attendance at a 
regular cycle of meetings (Interview 6). However, elsewhere, interviewees representing 
industry clusters were critical of a lack of support from their respective mayors (Interviews 4 
and 7).  
 
Then again, both local governments and industry clusters have been able to augment these 
resources with other sources of finance and technical assistance. GIZ has long been active in 
funding capacity building projects in Central Java including the provision of specialist design 
expertise after a study of the value chain of the rattan furniture industry in Sukoharjo (GTZ, 
2008). Similarly, the leader of batik Laweyan commented that the major assistance received 
in Laweyan had not come via the FEDEP but other bodies such as GIZ (Interview 4). 
 
It was the opinion of the GIZ consultant involved with the FEDEP programme that money was 
not the critical factor but the relevance of the policies formulated by each FEDEP and the 
technical capacity that could be mobilised (Interview 1). In most of our study locations then 
table 3 indicates that resources did not emerge as the critical issue regarding the adaptive 
efficiency of these new institutions given a generally strong commitment to and organisation 
the FEDEPs. The FEDEPs we studied did vary in their relationship to local government 
organisational structures and the staff time that could be called on. At one extreme the FEDEP 
in Sukoharjo appeared to be highly reliant on one individual who was the secretary for the 
FEDEP, organiser and attendee at all forty meetings across ten industry clusters scheduled 
for early 2013. At the other extreme, we were met by four people from the economic section 
of Bappeda who could represent the FEDEP in Jepara in some capacity.  
 
The human resources that each FEDEP can call upon are also related to the composition of 
the FEDEP itself. The FEDEPs sit within local government bureaucracies and are often staffed 
by officers from relevant implementing government departments. For some this has proven 
precisely the problem for implementation. The complaint from the Chairman of the Laweyan 
batik cluster here was that the members involved with the FEDEP are local government 
‘conscripts’ who lacked passion and the appropriate talent to implement projects (Interview 4). 
In other FEDEPs, such as Jepara, where the private sector membership exceeds the public 
sector (Interview 8), the issue may be less severe.  
 
In several instances the FEDEPs have chosen not to support particular industry clusters – 
perceiving them to be large enough to self-organise. In Jepara, the wooden furniture industry 
was not one of the nine supported by the FEDEP (Interview 8). With an estimated 16,000 
businesses, the industry cluster is significantly export-oriented and organised through a 
branch of the national industry association ASMINDO. Joint action exists in a hierarchical 
sense both in terms of this peak industry association and the private organisation of the 
putting-out of production (Interview 2).       
 
Something of the adaptive efficiency of these new institutions might be gauged through 
evaluations of the performance of the FEDEPs over four phases and a total of 23 detailed 
indicators (P5 Universitas Diponegoro, 2013). The four phases are: (1) the strengthening the 
institutional platform of the forum; (2) the mapping and analysis of district conditions; (3) the 
creation of an action plan; (4) the creation of an implementation programme. For each indicator 
a score (of 0,1,2,3 etc.) is achievable with a total maximum score of 60 achievable. This 
scoring system was weighted towards the earlier phases with a maximum score of 26 available 
for phase 1, 11 for phase 2, 15 for phase 3 and 8 for phase 4. The evaluation scores are 
presented in figure 2 from which several observations can be made.  
 
First, only Boyolali does not have a FEDEP – a situation ascribed to the disinterest of the 
mayor who was unwilling to allocate funds from the local government budget. Second, almost 
all of the districts in Central Java had moved to the final phase of implementing their action 
plans by 2012. On the one hand, this is a positive story of the development of new institutions 
within a little over a decade. On the other hand, the greatest variation in performances across 
local governments was apparent with respect to the final two phases relating to the creation 
of action and implementation plans.5 Among a number of concerns raised by GIZ - the co-
sponsor of the FEDEP system - was the need for local capacity to support better policy design 
and implementation (Interview 1). Third, those local governments with some of the largest and 
most developed industry clusters - including the four local governments we examined - 
generally had the better performing FEDEP organisations, which may imply a connection 
between the scale of the private sector and local government revenue and the effectiveness 
of the local FEDEP organisation. 
                                                          
5 The lowest average scores achieved (as a percentage of the total possible) was for phase 3 
at 60.4% compared to the highest of 76.1% for phase 1. The greatest range of scores achieved 
(as a percentage of the total possible) and the largest standard deviations were apparent for 
phases 3 and 4.        
Across the case study localities, our evidence summarised in table 3 suggests that the 
adaptive efficiency of the FEDEP institutions could be considered mixed in terms of their 
contributions to joint action at the level of clusters. The importance of social capital to the 
development of industry clusters and the need for its development in Indonesia has been 
emphasised (JICA, 2004). In Indonesia, industry clusters are often concentrated at the level 
of villages and are at least partly embedded in the strong social bonds and associated 
institutions of traditional Javanese culture. These include musyawarah (discussion or 
negotiation) and arisan (regular social gatherings and collective arrangements for saving 
money). These traditions could be a major source of social capital for industry clusters in 
Central Java (Interview 1). However, it is also possible they may be a source of inertia for the 
private sector. In several instances there seemed to have been protracted periods of 
negotiation to find suitable cluster leaders. In Laweyan, an outsider emerged as the batik 
industry cluster leader in order to generate a measure of trust among the different producer 
interests and in order to mobilise the local community to support the idea of batik production 
and tourism alongside residential uses (Interview 4).6  
 
Across the six industry clusters in four local authority areas, our study provided one notable 
example of the significant build-up of institutions designed specifically to support joint action. 
The strength of the FEDEP in Pekalongan in comparison to others appears to stem from the 
input of the private sector as members of the FEDEP board and the responsiveness of the 
FEDEP to private sector initiatives. Several key institutions devoted to the batik industry have 
been initiated by the FEDEP in Pekalongan. These include the Setono grocery batik market 
(which has grown from having 55 traders in 2002 to 700 today), a batik museum, a batik 
education institution (Pusmanu Polytechnic), the branding of two batik kampongs (Kauman 
and Pesindon) and an International Batik Centre (Interview 6). While these developments 
appear likely to underpin the continued scale of the industry it is less clear what role they have 
played in deepening the organisation and collective efficiency of the industry.  
 
Elsewhere the development of local institutions to underpin joint action is much more limited 
and often, with regards to the likes of training, conducted by leading businesses within the 
industry clusters. The head of the batik Kauman cluster in Surakarta, for example, trains 
people in his own business premises. The involvement of a vocational school in providing 
some training courses geared towards employment in businesses operating in the cluster has 
been at the initiative of the school itself and not the FEDEP or the industry cluster forum.      
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have documented one important initiative concerned with promoting joint 
action in industry clusters in a developing country. The creation and virtually complete 
coverage of these new FEDEP institutions and arrangements for monitoring performance and 
exchanging practice across Central Java are achievements in themselves. The FEDEPs and 
their respective industry cluster forums might be regarded as interim institutions in the vast 
laboratory for policy fomentation and exchange that is Indonesia. As interim institutions they 
have been struggling to define their role in shaping joint action for the promotion of external 
economies in industry clusters. To date, and in comparison to other interim institutions 
(Wollenburg, 2013), they do not appear to have been captured by elite interests. These new 
local institutions vary in terms of their status, organisation and resources and it will be 
important to examine how they mature in the coming years. 
 
However, at the outset of the paper we also drew attention to the likely limits of efforts to 
promote joint action. These limits included issues inherent to the organisation of any industry 
cluster and assumptions regarding whether external economies are indeed latent and can be 
                                                          
6 Some measure of the time required for new policy implementation is provided by the 104 
meetings that former Surakarta mayor Joko Widodo was said to have had in order to secure 
an acclaimed relocation of street vendors (Bunnell et al, 2013: 864). 
mobilised through joint action (Moreno-Monroy, 2012; Perry, 2005).  First, external economies 
may simply not be latent in several of the industry clusters we examined which had lost critical 
mass. This suggests that the timing of interventions in support of joint action institutional 
capacity building is crucial.  Second, although we were not able to delve deeply into whether 
businesses were unable to exploit external economies as a result of internal constraints on 
business growth, there was enough evidence from the conflicts that existed within industry 
clusters to suggest that the segmentation of industry remains a major issue for policy to 
address (Moreno-Monroy, 2012; Nichter and Goldmark, 2009). This tends to indicate that the 
concept of (horizontal and vertical) joint action among businesses may understate the extent 
to which ‘Even where a collective capacity to compete, adapt and innovate has emerged, it is 
important not to expect an island of unity and solidarity’ (Schmitz, 1995: 534). 
 
The theory of industry clustering or agglomeration contains some troubling elements of 
circularity (Phelps, 1992), among which is the difficulty of demonstrating whether institutions 
have been cause or effect of collective business performance. First, then, inspection of our six 
industry cluster cases suggests that the new FEDEP institutions are likely to have been as yet 
a modest causal contributor both to efforts at joint action and to the performance of industry 
clusters. If anything, joint action and associated institutions appeared to have been stronger 
in the past - reflecting the thought that industry institutions have more likely been a 
consequence of the past development of industry clusters. Beyond this imponderable, limits 
to policy for joint action also presented themselves in terms of the difficulties of designing 
appropriate institutions with a measure of adaptive efficiency (North, 2000). Thus, second, 
despite GIZs long presence in the development field including in Indonesia, our paper revealed 
some glimpses of the gap that can exist between initial hopes and expectations regarding 
institutional support for new institutional capacity and the reality in developing countries.  Some 
of this gap is generated as a result of the budgetary constraints on institutional and policy 
development found in a developing country like Indonesia (Masser, 1986). Third, however, 
beyond this, the gap between hopes and realities has as much to do with the commitment and 
abilities of the local government and political leaders involved and even perhaps some aspects 
of extant local social institutions. Thus, in several of the efforts to promote joint action we 
reported on, the situation might be characterised as one of joint inaction as observed a decade 
ago in a JICA (2004) study. Nevertheless, while there has been a degree of inaction on the 
part of some of these new local institutions to foster the development of industry clusters, this 
might be a harsh judgement to pass on an initiative that has been in existence for only a 
decade, when set against a recent period of turmoil and when seen in relation to the very long 
term over which similar institutions emerged historically in Europe.  
 
The thrust of this paper has been to go beyond merely the recognition of, and advocacy for, 
the institutional basis of localised external economies. Theory and policy advocacy can 
usefully still be contextualised both to the specifics of individual developing countries 
(Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999) and to longer-term historical trends in the organisation 
of societies and international trade and investment. Here, a fruitful dialogue can continue to 
be had between economists and economic geographers (Scott, 1983, 1986; Storper, 1995), 
scholars in development studies (Schmitz, 2005; Weijland, 1999) and anthropologists and 
historians (Perlin, 1983). 
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Figure 1 Map of regencies (kabupaten) and cities (kota) in Central Java  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Evaluation scores for regency and city local economic forums 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Basic descriptors of study districts/cities  
District/city Population GDP  per capita 
(Rupiah millions 
current prices) 
Number of 
welfare families 
as per cent of 
total population  
Land area 
(Hectares) 
Sukoharjo 863,693 (b) 14.34 (a) 20.12 % (c) 46,666 
Jepara 1,153,213 (c) 10.79 (c) 27.58 % (c) 100,413 
Surakarta 500,171 (b) 24.34 (b) 9.63 % (c) 4,404 
Pekalongan 290,870 (c) 16.13 (b) 18.28 (c) 4,525 
(a) 2011 
(b) 2012 
(c) 2013 
Sources: Kabupaten Jepara (2014a); Kabupaten Jepara (2014b); Kabupaten Sukoharjo 
(2014); Kota Surakarta (2013), Kota Pekalongan (2013), Provinsi Jawa Tengah (2013). For 
the sake of rough illustration, the highest value of 24.34 million rupiah per capita GDP in 
Surakarta amounts to US$1718 at exchange rate as of 25 October 2015.      
 
   
Table 2 Provincial and local government contributions to local FEDEPs in million rupiah   
Distri
ct/ 
city 
2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  Sum 
2009
-
2013 
 
 Prov
ince 
Cit
y/ 
dist
rict 
Prov
ince  
Cit
y/ 
dist
rict 
Prov
ince/ 
Cit
y/ 
dist
rict 
Prov
ince 
Cit
y/ 
dist
rict 
Prov
ince 
Cit
y/ 
dist
rict 
Prov
ince 
Cit
y/ 
dist
rict 
Sukoh
arjo 
75 30 75 35 80 30 90 35 90 60 410 190 
Jepar
a 
90 65 85 65 85 0 100 20 100 20 460 170 
Surak
arta 
80 25 70 17.
5 
60 17.
5 
75 40 80 15 365 210 
Pekal
ongan 
75 75 75 75 75 75 80 25 80 20 385 270 
 
Source: Forum Pengembangan Ekonomidan Sumberdaya (FPESD) Bappeda, Jawa Tengah, 
Semarang. For the sake of rough illustration, the highest value of 460 million rupiah worth of 
funding to Jepara FEDEP over the 4 years amounts to US$33,776 at exchange rate as of 25 
October 2015.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Summary findings of study clusters and district and city FEDEP organisations.  
 
 Surakarta Sukoharjo Jepara Pekalongan 
Kauman Laweyan 
Industry 
cluster 
Batik batik Wooden 
furniture 
Rattan 
furniture 
Wood carving batik 
Latency of 
external 
economies 
 
Critical 
Mass 
No: much diminished 
and relocated to 
neighbouring 
districts 
Yes: but 
much 
diminished 
Yes; but 
diminished 
Yes: 
emerging but 
with limits to 
growth  
Yes: still quite 
sizeable  
Industry-self 
organisation 
Vertical Horizontal Horizontal Vertical Partial 
horizontal 
Vertical 
Institutions 
for joint 
action 
 
Appropriate 
design: 
purpose 
and 
strategic 
focus 
Yes: focus on one 
cluster at a time 
 
No: Wide focus on ten 
clusters 
No: continued 
debate and 
large number 
of clusters 
supported 
Yes: limited 
focus on two 
clusters 
Adaptive 
efficiency: 
financial 
and human 
resources 
Yes: finance and 
human resources 
significantly 
augmented by non-
local and provincial 
government actors  
No: one person performing 
multiple roles 
Yes: early 
and continued 
financial and 
organisational 
resources 
committed  
Yes: 
organisational 
resources 
committed 
with private 
sector 
involvement 
and clear 
organisational 
structure and 
rotation  
Adaptive 
efficiency: 
social 
context 
Unclear: unclear 
how traditions of 
arisan and 
musyawarah will 
contribute to 
adaptation of 
industry 
 
Unclear: 
can 
horizontal 
coordination 
be extended 
under 
current 
syndicate 
model?  
No: 
coordination 
unlikely to 
deepen in 
presence of 
significant 
intra-
industry 
dispute?  
Unclear: 
horizontal 
industry 
organisation 
may deepen   
Yes: some 
evidence of 
new 
institutions  
 
 
 
 
